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Abstract
The purpose of a social choice rule is to resolve conflicts among the preferences of
a group of individuals. We should therefore require a social choice rules not to remain
indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences. Sup-
pose we also adopt the requirements of a universal domain, strict Pareto optimality and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. We then obtain the existence of a dictatorship
(for binary choices) already under the weak consistency assumption that the group’s
choice function must always generate a preference relation that is acyclical over triples of
alternatives. By contrast to other theorems, this results holds without any restrictions on
the size of the group and without the axiom of positive responsiveness. Under the same
consistency condition, we furthermore obtain an axiomatic characterization of seniority
rules, also known as lexical dictatorships.
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A Note on Impossibility Theorems
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In 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet constructed a profile of individual preferences
that leads to a cyclical group preference under pairwise majority voting. Suppose the
group consists of three individuals 1,2,3 and we have the following rankings of three social
alternatives x, y, z: x Â1 y Â1 z, y Â2 z Â2 x and z Â3 x Â3 y. If we now hold major-
ity votes in pairwise comparisons of these alternatives, we obtain the following cyclical
group preference: x Â0 y Â0 z Â0 x. Since this preference relation exhibits a striking
form of ‘inconsistency’, the tradition following Arrow (1951) has focused on exploring
which consistency properties, if any, can possibly be satisfied by some appropriate voting
mechanism. Apart from the violation of some consistency norm, Condorcet’s example
raises, however, an additional difficulty for the group’s decision making in as far as the
group’s cyclical preference cannot recommend the choice of any one of the three social
alternatives. We may thus criticize pairwise majority voting for remaining indecisive and
being unable to resolve the individuals’ manifest conflict of interests. In this respect, a
large number of voting mechanisms fail their very purpose. When we, for instance, apply
de Borda’s rule to Condorcet’s example, we obtain a group preference that is indifferent
between all three alternatives. Though fully rational and consistent, this preference again
remains agnostic about how to resolve the individuals’ conflict of interests that made the
application of some social choice mechanism desirable in the first place. We shall there-
fore require a social choice rule to be conflict resolving in the sense that it recommends
either x or y (but not both) whenever there is some individual who strictly prefers x over
y and some individual who strictly prefers y over x. Note that this property does not
require the societal choice function to be ‘resolute’ in the sense that it always chooses
a unique alternative. Conflict resolution admits the set {x, y} as the group choice if all
individuals are indifferent between x and y and is thus compatible with the condition of
Pareto indifference. We shall apply this resolution condition, firstly, to the derivation of
an Arrovian ‘impossibility’ and, secondly, to the characterization of seniority rules.
Blair, Bordes, Kelly and Suzumura have studied Arrovian impossibilities under the
weak consistency condition of base triple–acyclicity. This condition does not impute the
existence of some preference relation generating, or ‘rationalizing’, the group’s choice
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function. Suppose the group makes three choices, the first between x and y, the second
between y and z and the third between x and z. If the group chooses x in the first choice
and y in the second choice, then base triple–acyclicity requires the group not to choose z in
the third choice. Hence, the base relation generated by the group’s choice function should
be acyclical over all triples of alternatives. In other words, it should not be possible to
turn the group into a money–pump by using only three alternatives (although there may
exist more sophisticated ways of money–pumping the group by using more than three
alternatives). In addition to base triple–acyclicity, Blair, Bordes, Kelly and Suzumura
also adopt the conditions of an unrestricted domain, binary independence of irrelevant
alternatives and binary weak Pareto optimality. They then obtain the existence of a
dictatorship for choices between two alternatives, but only for a group with at least
four individuals and only in the presence of positive responsiveness (cf. Blair et al.,
1976, Theorem 7 and the remarks in Suzumura, 1983, p. 98). By contrast, we shall
derive the existence of a dictatorship without either the axiom of positive responsiveness
or a restriction on the number of individuals. Instead, the above resolution condition
suffices to derive the existence of a dictatorship for choices between two alternatives from
the base triple–acyclicity of the societal choice function, an unrestricted domain, binary
independence of irrelevant alternatives and binary strict Pareto optimality.
A second application of the resolution condition concerns a positive characterization
of seniority rules under weak consistency assumptions. Seniority rules use an exogenous
hierarchy that determines the order in which individuals’ preferences are taken into ac-
count in an allocation problem. Under this method, the most senior individual first
chooses his preferred subset from the feasible set of social alternatives. If this subset con-
tains only one element, then this element is the socially chosen alternative. If the most
senior individual chooses a subset with more than one element, then the second most
senior individual can choose his preferred alternatives from this subset. The method
continues in the same way for all individuals ranked according to their seniority. Many
actual allocation procedures are of this type and draw on an exogenous hierarchy in which
seniority may be determined by age, waiting time, professional rank etc. (Elster, 1991).
Seniority rules stay true to the individuals’ preferences but, at the same time, do not
require any interpersonal comparisons of welfare on the part of the social decision maker.
As a particular example, we have elsewhere examined the allocation of cadaveric donor
kidneys on the basis of recipients’ waiting time. This allocation method automatically
protects disadvantaged patient types who quickly ‘bubble up to the top’ of the waiting
list and thus enjoy priority in the allocation process. Allocation by waiting time thus
turns out to preserve what seems to be a set of particularly robust fairness judgments,
without requiring the determination of less robust interpersonal trade–offs (Hild, 2001).
In this example, a suitable choice of the exogenous hierarchy ensures that the most senior
individual is also the morally most deserving individual.
Since seniority rules based on some judiciously chosen hierarchy can thus have morally
attractive properties, it is regrettable that these rules have indiscriminately been slan-
dered as ‘lexical dictatorships’. Indeed, the most senior individual in a seniority rule fits
Arrow’s formal definition of a dictator — a term which clearly carries negative connota-
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tions. On a constructive note, Luce and Raiffa (1957) already pointed out that a rein-
terpretation and a slight technical modification of Arrow’s impossibility result provides
a positive characterization of the class of seniority rules. To obtain this characterization,
we strengthen weak Pareto optimality to strict Pareto optimality and add the condition
of Pareto indifference. In the presence of Arrow’s strong consistency assumption, the
conditions of a universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives then deliver
the desired result. By how much could we weaken Arrow’s consistency assumption and
still obtain a positive characterization of seniority rules? The literature does not provide
an answer to this question. The above result by Blair, Bordes, Kelly and Suzumura,
for instance, is restricted to populations with at least four individuals and thus remains
silent on the treatment of the three most junior individuals. Similar restrictions on the
size of the group apply to related results (e.g., Theorem 5 by the same authors). This
lacuna does not seem to trouble the literature, probably because the existence of an oli-
garchy or a dictator is predominantly interpreted as an ‘impossibility result’. Under this
negative interpretation, there is indeed no reason — other than mathematical curiosity
— why one should be interested in the conditions under which not just a single dictator
but also a hierarchy of dictators exists. Since, in our view, this negative conclusion is
premature, we also provide a characterization of seniority rules, both for choices between
two alternatives and for choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. These
characterizations use the consistency assumption of base triple–acyclicity and of weak
rationalizability, respectively.
Theorem
Let X be a non–empty set of possible options. Let O be the set of all orderings on X,
i.e., of all binary relations on X that are complete and transitive. We write ‘Â’ for the
asymmetric part and ‘∼’ for the symmetric part of a binary relation º. Let S be a set
of non–empty subset of X such that {x, y} ∈ S for any x, y ∈ X. C is a choice function
if and only if C : S → S and C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ S. Let C be the set of all choice
functions. A choice function C generates a binary relation º on X exactly when, for all
x, y ∈ X, x º y if only if x ∈ C({x, y}). We write ‘ºC ’ for the relation generated by
C. This relation is called the ‘base relation of’ C. A binary relation º on X generates
a function C if and only if C(S) = {x ∈ S|∀y ∈ S : x º y} for any S ∈ S. We write
‘Cº’ for the choice function generated by º. A choice function C is rationalizable if and
only if there exists some binary relation º on X that generates C. We note that a choice
function C is rationalizable if and only if ºC generates C.
Let I ∈ N+ be a fixed number of individuals. F is a social choice rule if and only if
there exists some O ⊆ OI such that F : O → C. A social choice rule F is a seniority
rule if and only if there is a permutation σ of {1, . . . , I} such that, for any 〈ºi〉 in the
domain of F :
(Seniority) F (〈ºi〉) = Cºσ(I) ◦ . . . ◦ Cºσ(1)
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We say that a social choice rule F is a seniority rule for binary choices if and only if
there is a permutation σ of {1, . . . , I} such that, for any 〈ºi〉 in the domain of F and
any x, y ∈ X, [F (〈ºi〉)]({x, y}) = [Cºσ(I) ◦ . . . ◦ Cºσ(1) ]({x, y}). Equivalently, a social
choice rule F is a seniority rule for binary choices if and only if there is a permutation σ
of {1, . . . , I} such that the following holds for any 〈ºi〉 in the domain of F : (i) x ÂC0 y if
and only if there is some 1 ≤ j ≤ I such that x Âσ(j) y and x ∼σ(k) y for every 1 ≤ k < j
and (ii) x ∼C0 y if and only if x ∼σ(k) y for every 1 ≤ k ≤ I (where C0 := F (〈ºi〉)).
Let F be a social choice rule. We then say that F has a universal domain if and
only if its domain is OI . F is base triple–acyclical if and only if, for any 〈ºi〉 in the
domain of F and for any x, y, z ∈ X, if C0({x, y}) = {x} and C0({y, z}) = {y}, then
C0({x, z}) 6= {z} (where C0 := F (〈ºi〉)). Equivalently, any choice function C in the
domain of F must generate a base relation ºC that is triple–acyclical (i.e., for which
x ÂC y and y ÂC z implies z 6ÂC x, for any x, y, z ∈ X). F satisfies binary conflict
resolution if and only if, for any 〈ºi〉 in the domain of F and for any x, y ∈ X, if there
exist some 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ I with x Âj y and y Âj′ x, then C0({x, y}) 6= {x, y} (where
C0 := F (〈ºi〉)). Note that C0({x, y}) 6= {x, y} is equivalent to the condition that either
C0({x, y}) = {x} or C0({x, y}) = {y}. Moreover, binary conflict resolution and base
triple–acyclicity alone are not sufficient to imply the transitivity (or quasi–transitivity) of
the base relation generated by the group’s choice function. F satisfies binary independence
(of irrelevant alternatives) if and only if, for any 〈ºi〉, 〈º′i〉 in the domain of F and for
any x, y ∈ X, if ºi |{x, y} = º′i |{x, y} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, then C0({x, y}) = C ′0({x, y})
(where C0 := F (〈ºi〉) and C ′0 := F (〈º′i〉)). In view of the confusion that pervades the
literature, it is perhaps worth repeating that independence of irrelevant alternatives is
an extremely weak property that is even satisfied by de Borda’s rule (cf. Plott, 1976 and
Bordes/Tideman, 1991). F satisfies binary strict Pareto preference if and only if, for any
〈ºi〉 in the domain of F and for any x, y ∈ X, if x ºi y for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and x Âj y for
some 1 ≤ j ≤ I, then C0({x, y}) = {x} (where C0 := F (〈ºi〉)). F satisfies binary Pareto
indifference if and only if, for any 〈ºi〉 in the domain of F and for any x, y ∈ X, if x ∼i y
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, then C0({x, y}) = {x, y} (where C0 := F (〈ºi〉)). F is rationalizable
if and only if any choice function in the range of F is rationalizable, i.e., if and only if
any choice function in the range of F is generated by some binary relation on X. The
concept of rationalizability involves no further assumptions about the properties of the
binary relation generating a rationalizable choice function. It follows merely that the
base relation generated by a rationalizable choice function must be acyclical. Finally,
we say that j (1 ≤ j ≤ I) is a (binary) dictator for F if and only if, for every 〈ºi〉 in
the domain of F and any x, y ∈ X, we have C0({x, y}) = {x} whenever x Âj y (where
C0 := F (〈ºi〉)).
Theorem 1 (Binary Dictatorship) Assume that X has at least three elements. If
F is a social choice rule that has a universal domain and which satisfies base triple–
acyclicity, binary conflict resolution, binary independence, binary strict Pareto optimal-
ity, then there exists a binary dictator for F .
Theorem 2 (Binary Seniority Rules) Assume that X has at least three elements and
that F is a social choice rule with a universal domain. Then F is a seniority rule for
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binary choices if and only if F satisfies base triple–acyclicity, binary conflict resolution,
binary independence, binary Pareto indifference and binary strict Pareto optimality.
Corollary 3 (Seniority Rules) Assume that X has at least three elements and that F
is a social choice rule with a universal domain. Then F is a seniority rule if and only
if F is rationalizable and satisfies binary conflict resolution, binary independence, binary
Pareto indifference and binary strict Pareto optimality.
Proofs
We draw on results by Gibbard (1969) , Sen (1970) and Mas–Colell/Sonnenschein (1972)
who derive the existence not of a dictator, but of an oligarchy under the assumption
that the societal choice function always generates a quasi–transitive base relation. Let
V ∗ := {1, . . . , I}. Let V be the set of all subsets of V ∗ and let V+ be the set of all
non–empty subsets of V ∗. For any V ∈ V+ and any W ∈ V with V ∩W = ∅, we say
that V is decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 ∈ X2 modulo W if and only if, for every 〈ºi〉 in the
domain of F , we have [F (〈ºi〉)]({x, y}) = {x} whenever x Âj y for all j ∈ V and x ∼k y
for all k ∈ W . For any V ∈ V+ and any W ∈ V with V ∩ W = ∅, we say that V
is almost decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 ∈ X2 modulo W if and only if, for every 〈ºi〉 in the
domain of F , we have [F (〈ºi〉)]({x, y}) = {x} whenever x Âj y for all j ∈ V , y Âj′ x for
all j′ ∈ V ∗ − V −W and x ∼k y for all k ∈ W . For any V ∈ V+ and any W ∈ V with
V ∩W = ∅, we say that V is globally decisive for F modulo W if and only if V is decisive
for F on any 〈x, y〉 ∈ X2 modulo W . For any 1 ≤ j ≤ I and W ∈ V with j /∈ W , j is a
(binary) dictator for F modulo W if and only if {j} is globally decisive for F modulo W .
Lemma 4 Assume that X has at least three elements and that F is a social choice rule
that has a universal domain and which satisfies base triple–acyclicity, binary conflict
resolution, binary independence and binary strict Pareto optimality. Then for any W ⊂
V ∗, there exists some j ∈ V ∗ −W such that j is a binary dictator for F modulo W .
Proof of lemma: Suppose that W ⊂ V ∗. Step 1: We establish that any coalition
V ∈ V+ with V ∩W = ∅ is globally decisive for F modulo W if it is almost decisive
for F on some pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ X2 modulo W and if x 6= y. Assume that V ∈ V+ with
V ∩W = ∅ is almost decisive for F on some pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ X2 modulo W and that x 6= y.
Suppose that 〈x∗, y∗〉 ∈ X2. We claim that V is decisive for F on 〈x∗, y∗〉 modulo W . If
x∗ = y∗, then the claim is trivial. Suppose therefore that x∗ 6= y∗.
Case 1: The set {x, y}∩{x∗, y∗} is empty. Hence, x, y, x∗ and y∗ are four distinct elements
of X. Then there exists some 〈ºi〉 ∈ OI such that the restriction of ºi to {x, y, x∗, y∗}
satisfies the following conditions: x∗ Âi x Âi y Âi y∗ for any i ∈ V , y Âi x∗ Âi x and
y Âi y∗ Âi x for any i ∈ V ∗ − V −W , and x ∼i y ∼i x∗ ∼i y∗ for any i ∈ W . By the
assumption of a universal domain, C0 := F (〈ºi〉) is well–defined. Let º0 be the binary
relation generated by C0. By binary strict Pareto optimality, x
∗ Â0 x and y Â0 y∗. Since
V is almost decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 moduloW , we have x Â0 y. By base triple–acyclicity,
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we must have x∗ º0 y. By binary conflict resolution, we obtain x∗ 6∼0 y whence x∗ Â0 y.
Applying base triple–acyclicity once more, we obtain x∗ º0 y∗. If y∗ Âi x∗ for some
i ∈ V ∗ − V −W , then binary conflict resolution implies x∗ Â0 y∗. If x∗ ºi y∗ for all
i ∈ V ∗ − V −W , then by binary strict Pareto optimality also yields x∗ Â0 y∗. In any
case, we have x∗ Â0 y∗. Binary independence then implies that V is decisive for F on
〈x∗, y∗〉 modulo W .
Case 2: The set {x, y} ∩ {x∗, y∗} contains exactly one element. There are four possible
cases: x = x∗, x = y∗, y = x∗ or y = y∗. We only consider the sub-case where x = x∗.
We then must have y 6= y∗. Thus, x, y and y∗ must be three distinct elements of X.
Then there exists some 〈ºi〉 ∈ OI such that the restriction of ºi to {x, y, y∗} satisfies
the following conditions: x Âi y Âi y∗ for any i ∈ V , y Âi x and y Âi y∗ for any
i ∈ V ∗ − V −W and x ∼i y ∼i y∗ for any i ∈ W . By the assumption of a universal
domain, C0 := F (〈ºi〉) is well–defined. Let º0 be the binary relation generated by C0.
By binary strict Pareto optimality, y Â0 y∗. Since V is almost decisive for F on 〈x, y〉
modulo W , we have x Â0 y. Base triple–acyclicity implies x º0 y∗. If y∗ Âi x for some
i ∈ V ∗−V −W , then binary conflict resolution implies x Â0 y∗. Otherwise, binary strict
Pareto optimality yields x Â0 y∗. In any case, binary independence implies that V is
decisive for F on 〈x, y∗〉 = 〈x∗, y∗〉 modulo W .
Case 3: The set {x, y} ∩ {x∗, y∗} contains exactly two elements. Case 3.1: x∗ = y and
y∗ = x. Since X has at least three elements, there exists some z ∈ X − {x, y}. By Case
2, since V is almost decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 modulo W , V is decisive (and, hence, almost
decisive) for F on 〈z, y〉 modulo W . Again by Case 2, V must therefore be decisive (and,
hence, almost decisive) for F on 〈z, x〉 modulo W . Again by Case 2, V is thus decisive
for F on 〈y, x〉 = 〈x∗, y∗〉 modulo W . Case 3.2: x∗ = x and y∗ = y. Since V is almost
decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 modulo W , the result of the previous case 3.1 implies that V is
decisive (and, hence, almost decisive) for F on 〈y, x〉 modulo W . The same result then
also implies that V is decisive for F on 〈x, y〉 modulo W .
Step 2: We now show that there exists a binary dictator for F modulo W . Let D
be the set of all coalitions V ∈ V+ with V ∩W = ∅ that are globally decisive for F
modulo W . By binary strict Pareto optimality, the set V ∗ −W is globally decisive for
F modulo W and, hence, D is non–empty. Hence, there exists some ‘smallest’ coalition
V0 ∈ D such that (*) any proper subset of V0 is not in D. Suppose j ∈ V0. We now show
that {j} is globally decisive for F modulo W . By assumption, there exists three different
alternatives x, y, z ∈ X. Hence, there exists some 〈ºi〉 ∈ OI such that the restriction
of ºi to {x, y, z} satisfies the following conditions: y Âj z Âj x, x Âi y Âi z for any
i ∈ V0 − {j}, z Âi x Âi y for any i ∈ V ∗ − V0 −W , and x ∼i y ∼i z for any i ∈ W .
Since, by assumption, V0 is globally decisive for F modulo W , we have y Â0 z. If we had
x Â0 z, then V0 − {j} would be almost decisive for F on 〈x, z〉 modulo W (by binary
independence). By Step 1, V0−{j} would then also be globally decisive, in contradiction
with (*). Hence, we must have z º0 x and, by binary conflict resolution, z Â0 x. By
base triple–acyclicity, we obtain y º0 x and, again by binary conflict resolution, y Â0 x.
By binary independence, we conclude that j is almost decisive for F on 〈y, x〉 modulo
W . By Step 1, j is then a binary dictator for F modulo W . (Incidentally, this means
that V0 = {j}.) ¤
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Proof of Theorem 1: According to our earlier definition, it follows that j is a binary
dictator for F if and only if j is a binary dictator for F modulo ∅. The lemma then
establishes the claim. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2: It is easy to show that a seniority rule for binary choices sat-
isfies the properties listed in the theorem. We therefore suppose that F satisfies these
properties and show that F is a seniority rule for binary choices. By our lemma, there
exists some 1 ≤ j1 ≤ I such that j1 is a binary dictator for F . Define σ(1) := j1. By the
same lemma, there exists a binary dictator j2 for F modulo {j1}. Define σ(2) := j2 and
continue analogously until σ is defined for any 1 ≤ i ≤ I. Suppose that 〈ºi〉 ∈ OI and
x, y ∈ X. Let º0 be the binary relation generated by F (〈ºi〉). We have to show that
(**) x Â0 y if and only if there is some 1 ≤ j ≤ I such that x Âσ(j) y and x ∼σ(k) y for
every 1 ≤ k < j, and x ∼0 y if and only if x ∼σ(k) y for every 1 ≤ k ≤ I. If x ∼i y for all
1 ≤ i ≤ I, then x ∼0 y (by binary Pareto indifference) and (**) is trivially satisfied. Sup-
pose therefore that there is some 1 ≤ i ≤ I with x 6∼i y. Let k (1 ≤ k ≤ I) be the smallest
number such that x 6∼σ(k) y. Without loss in generality, we can assume that x Âσ(k) y.
Let W := {σ(l)|1 ≤ l < k} and note that x ∼i y for all i ∈ W . By definition of σ, we
know that σ(k) is a binary dictator for F modulo W . Hence, [F (〈ºi〉)]({x, y}) = {x}.
This establishes claim (**). ¤
Proof of Corollary 3: It is again easy to show that a seniority rule satisfies the
properties listed in the corollary. We therefore suppose that F satisfies these properties
and show that F is a seniority rule. We note that a rationalizable choice function always
generates a base relation that is triple–acyclical. Hence, the previous theorem implies
that F is a seniority rule for binary choices. Since F is rationalizable, it must also be a
seniority rule for arbitrary choice sets. ¤
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